'Achieving trans-boundary cooperation is always a long and complex journey; there is no single path and there are few short cuts. […]. Political will and commitment from all Governments, at all levels, are prerequisites for successful trans-boundary water management' (UN-Water)
Rivers which run trans-boundary and thus cross borders between countries contribute 60% of the global freshwater resources and supply 40% of the world population with water. But, it is the quality of the inter-state management of the shared rivers which determines if populations live under conditions of water security or water insecurity. Decreased water security has implications on national security. The global phenomenon of growing water scarcity (reasons: growing world population, climatic changes, water overexploitation) and consequently growing competition for water makes trans-boundary water management become more and more important.
Water competition can be origin of inter-state conflicts as well as a strong catalyst for inter-state cooperation. The cost for non-cooperation is very high under any circumstance: Economies, interstate relations and human development are heavily subjected. Ultimately, international rivers are entities where all socio-political realities and disparities of riparian states collide. Under conditions of water scarcity it is challenging for states to reconcile demands and govern water within their boundaries in an optimized way, but as soon as the water is shared with other countries that task can surmount to a major governance problem.
From 1948 to 1999 1,228 cooperative events and 507 conflictive events, including 37 acute disputes which involved violence, occurred world-wide over international rivers. Of the 37 acute disputes 30 ignited in the Middle East. Conflicts arouse around two issues: Water allocation and unilaterally erected infrastructure (dams built by one country without accordance of the neighbor countries downstream). 90% of the conflictive events and 21 incidents of extensive military intervention were provoked by disagreement on these issues which cause conflict in particular in the absence of a treaty among the member states over the use of the shared river or a river commission which manages the river. A river commission is made up of representatives of the member states and is an advanced governance mechanism, compared to a treaty, both have the same purpose.
Along trans-boundary rivers without a treaty conflicts arise 2.6 times more often than along rivers with a treaty in place among the member states. Reasons for cooperation in contrast to conflict are manifold and interdependence on water creates conditions for regionally defined development concepts. Many international rivers are successfully managed by co-riparian states, even where relations are hostile, as for example in the case of the river Indus managed by India and Pakistan.
Regional example - the Middle East, and Euphrates and Tigris river system
The Middle East is the most arid and water poor region on the globe. Water security requires a minimum of 1,700 m³ of renewable water available per capita per year. In countries where these levels cannot be secured to the population conditions of water stress, water scarcity and absolute water scarcity predominate. In the Middle East the annual freshwater availability per capita averages at 1,100 m³. By 2050 it is projected to halve to 550 m³ owing to high population growth rates and the impacts of climate change on the water resources. An annual quantity of 500 m³ per person is the threshold to absolute water scarcity. The region depletes its water resources excessively and stores 85% of its surface water in reservoirs (global average 10%) which supply the worldwide largest irrigation infrastructure and which are affected by high water losses due to evaporation (hot).
Turkey, Syria and Iraq differ strongly in terms of water resource availability and management, economic development, population size and growth, political conditions and stability. Euphrates and Tigris originate in southeastern Anatolia in Turkey, cross Syria (the Tigris flanks it in the north-east) and cross the Iraq from north to south where they join and form the Shatt-al-Arab 200 km before their waters discharge into the Persian Gulf. The dependency ratios of Syria and Iraq on external water are high and they utilize above 80% of their available water – they operate at their very limits and that despite the existence of an external risk. Turkey depends to only 1% on external water resources and it withdraws approximately 18% of the water it has available. Turkey and Iraq are both officially water secure whereas Syria is water scarce. Climate change affects the region severely. The flow of Euphrates is predicted to decline by 20-30% within this century. According to economists the GDP of Iraq might be reduced by 3-6%, the GDP of Syria by 4-7% by the impacts on the water resources alone.
The year 1946 earmarks the start of the period of enhanced interaction between Turkey, Syria and Iraq - both cooperative and conflictive in nature - about the use of Euphrates and Tigris. The biggest issue between the three states is Turkey’s GAP project in Southeastern Anatolia to develop the Turkish region primarily through irrigated agriculture supplied by 22 large dams constructed along Euphrates and Tigris, as inevitably Syria and Iraq are affected. GAP project, launched in the 1970s, is the biggest infrastructure and economic development project in Turkey’s history and has immense national importance. It shall not only develop the country’s poorest region but cover a large share of the national electricity demand through hydropower production. At full development GAP can reduce the flow of Euphrates by 30-55%, of Tigris by 10-14%. Owing to the tremendous influence of GAP project on the water security of Syria and Iraq a long period of struggle was triggered between the three states.
Syria is the most water scarce country of the three and compared to Iraq it has very little fossil energy resources. Along the past century it was among the three states the most aggressive and threatening in a military sense, it caused extreme harm to Turkey’s economy, national security and stability through actively promoting the PKK from 1983 to 1998. More than 100,000 people died in the civil war in south-eastern Anatolia as Turkey fought the separatist movement. Iraq has huge fossil energy wealth, but it is socio-politically entirely devastated. It has due to the wars the highest development burdens to overcome. Relations between Turkey and Iraq were considerably less conflictive than between Turkey and Syria, Iraq and Turkey cooperated in security issues. In conflictive phases Iraq exerted pressure on Turkey through the strategy of oil delivery suspension. Turkey is highly dependent on Iraq’s oil. Relations between Iraq and Syria were for decades characterized by strong political rivalry, which on a number of occasions almost caused armed conflict. Improvement in the relations between Iraq and Syria materialized due to the joint struggle of the countries over Turkey’s largest dam - Atatürk Dam – and manifested from 1989. In 1998s the PKK conflict was resolved and the tensions between Turkey and Syria began to ease. (Please note, this was written in 2011/12 at the beginning of the war in Syria)
The inter-state management of Euphrates and Tigris of Turkey, Syria and Iraq is an interesting one as it is unique among the major trans-boundary rivers in the world - it is the story of 66 years of failure to establish a system to jointly govern the shared river-system, whereas riparian states of other major international rivers succeeded in that. There is a lot to be learned from it.
At the least 50% of the utilized waters of Euphrates and Tigris get lost in the irrigation systems of Turkey, Syria and Iraq. In 20 years Iraq and Syria will have become approximately 40% more populous than they are now. Euphrates and Tigris will have lost a certain percentage of its volume as aridity increases. Iraq and Syria experience their water limits and risk their water security if they continue the strategy of non-acting at home (NOT reforming their agriculture sector and irrigation system) but blaming Turkey for developing structures along Euphrates and Tigris. Instead it would be advisable to improve their water performance and confront the deficiencies in their planning system – it is an advantage to have Turkey which is ahead in water demand management and in reforming its agriculture sector.
Syria and Iraq claim to obtain the same share of Euphrates-Tigris waters as Turkey despite smaller populations (Turkey had 79,7 million people, Syria and Iraq together had about 53 million in 2012). This claim is among the reasons the negotiation process was stuck over decades. A fair distribution of water can only be established if the trans-boundary water management is programmed as fully responsive to the riparian societies’ real water needs. Then water allocation and use can be balanced to a level where water waste is minimized and which is most profitable to the riparian societies and the whole region. To achieve that first every riparian has to accept to shoulder the same domestic and trans-boundary responsibility and enable the assessment of realistic water needs. Then a leveling of all biases in water sector development which distort water demands to best regional standard is necessary.
It is obvious that low political will was among the root causes of most strategic mistakes and it caused damage beyond imagination. Eventually a point is reached where major planning mistakes can no more be afforded also due to advancing climate change effects. A very positive strategic change would be to stop regarding Turkey’s GAP project as a threat and instead seize it as an opportunity – for joint projects, for joint-learning, for joint capacity-building and in fact Syria and Iraq began to do so. (State of research 2012)